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By David N. Cassuto0
I. Introduction
Imagine that a company conducts a voluntary envi-
ronmental audit. As a result of that audit the company
learns it is in violation of the law. It reports the violation
to the authorities and brings its operation into compli-
ance. Should the company face a governmental enforce-
ment action?
This is not an easy question. Absolving the company
of liability would arguably reward it, not just for its hon-
esty; but for its violation as well. It would reap the eco-
nomic benefit of its noncompliance with environmental
regulations and suffer no penalty when the violation is
revealed. On the other hand, punishing the company
carries its own potentially serious drawbacks. Vigorously
prosecuting a regulated entity for admitting and correct-
ing its error could pose a significant deterrent to any
future self-policing by the regulated community
The federal government, in the guise of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency), has
sought the middle ground on this issue. The Agency's
stated policy encourages self-audits without ceding its
enforcement power. EPA enumerated its policy in two
successive guidance documents released in 1995 (with
the second one superceding the first). In both its Interim
Policy Statement (issued April 3, 1995) and Final Policy
Statemeht 2 (issued December 22, 1995), the Agency
offered various incentives to industries to spur them to
self-audit, including reducing economic penalties and
not recommending criminal prosecution.3
Nineteen states have gone further, enacting laws
granting various degrees of privilege to audit results
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1, Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure
Interim Policy Statement. 60 Fed Reg 16,875 f1995) Ihereinafter
Interim Policy Statementl
2, Incentives for Self-Policing. Discovery, Disclosure,
Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed- Reg 66,706 1 1995)
Ihereinafter Final Policy Statementl
3, EPXs position presented a significant departure from its
previous stance, which was -EPA will not promise to forego inspec-
tions, reduce enforcement responses, or offer other such incentives
in exchange for implementation of environmental auditing or other
sound environmental management practices - United States
Environmental Protection Agency. Environmental Auditing Policy
Statement, 51 Fed Reg 25,004, 25,007 (1986)
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and in some cases giving immunity to the vio-
lator 4 States with privilege and immunity laws
claim that in order to provide industry with an
adequate incentive to self-police, the govern-
ment must offer sufficient guarantees that they
will not prosecute violators who disclose and
remediate on their own initiative. Proponents
of the state initiatives label the federal policy a
"seek and ye shall be fined" approach to envi-
ronmental management.
In states with privilege laws, regulated
entities can refuse to disclose regulatory viola-
tions discovered during voluntary self-audits
as long as they correct the violations within a
statutorily designated time period. States with
immunity regimes disallow penalties for viola-
tions that are discovered through internal self-
audits and then corrected voluntarily.
EPA strongly opposed the majority of state
initiatives, arguing that many privilege and
immunity statutes curtail the public's right to
know, interfere with the government's enforce-
ment capability, foster litigation, and give an
unfair advantage to violators over those who
4. States with some form of self-audit laws include:
Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois. Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota. Mississippi, New
Hampshire. New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. For a capsule
discussion of each state's policy, see ELIZABETH GLAss
GELTMAN, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL AuDrrs 21 i-
58 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Memorandum from Steven A. Herman,
Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, EPA and Mary Nichols, Office of
Air & Radiation, to Jackson Fox, Regional Counsel, Region
X (Apr. 5, 1996), Re: "Effect of Audit immunity/Privilege
Laws on States' Ability to Enforce Title V Requirements"
(hereinafter "Memorandum from Steven Herman"l ("EPA
has consistently opposed blanket amnesties which
excuse repeated noncompliance, cnminal conduct, or
violations that result in serious harm or risk, as well as
audit privileges that shield evidence of violations from
regulators and jeopardize the public's right-to-know
about noncompliance."); see also David A. Dana, The Perverse
Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81 IowA L. REV.
969, 975-76 (1996) (arguing that immunity statutes serve
more as hazard management than hazard prevention,
since offering immunity for past wrongs provides no
incentive not to violate in the future).
6. The lntenm Policy Statement however, does sug-
gest, without elaboration, that the EPA will heighten its
scrutiny of environmental programs in states that have
comply with environmental laws.' Neverthe-
less, neither the Interim Policy nor the Final
Policy Statement enumerates EPXs likely reac-
tion to state-created audit protections.6 To
date, the Agency's responses have ranged from
silence to threats to revoke states' authority to
implement federal environmental laws (as dia-
grammed in State Implementation Plans, or
"SIPs").7 Most debates have ended in compro-
mise.
The varying state and federal policies
result from different judgments about how
best to enforce environmental laws. EPA main-
tains that companies already have adequate
incentive to self-audit, that EPA policy pro-
vides further incentive, and that fear of govern-
mental enforcement is not the primary factor
deterring companies from instituting self-audit
programs. 8 The Agency further argues that
additional incentives (i.e., state privilege
and/or immunity statutes) undermine the deli-
cate competitive balance among regulated
entities.9 It reasons that entities residing in
states with privilege and/or immunity statutes
passed laws protecting audit results, Interim Policy
Statement, supra note 1, at 16,878, The Final Policy
Statement, in addition to outlining EPA's firm opposition
to statutory environmental audit privileges and immuni.
ties, declares the agency's willingness to work with states
to address any provisions of state laws that are Inconsis-
tent with the federal policy. See Final Policy Statement,
supra note 2, at 66,712.
7 See Lynn L. Bergeson & Lisa M. Campbell, The
Debate Over Environmental Auditing. THE WASHINGTON LAWYER.
SeptJOct. 1997, at 43 ("Although EPA has made threats In
various states, no state, to date, has been deprived of del-
egated authority as a result of Its environmental audit
pnvilege provisions.").
8. See Commercial and Administrative Law Protection of
Environmental Self-Evaluation Data: Heanna Before the Comm
on the judiciary, 104th Cong. (June 29 1995) (statement of
Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. U.S EPA)
(hereinafter "Testimony of Steven Herman'] Indeed, the
agency maintains that a strong enforcement mechanism
provides a necessary incentive for industries to partici-
pate in voluntary compliance programs, Brian Riedel,
U.S. EPA, Vice Chair (Office of Planning and Policy
Analysis), Office of Enforcement and Compliance,
Address to Russian delegation, San Francisco (June 20,
1997).
9. See Testimony of Steven Herman, supra note 8
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gain a competitive advantage over those resid-
ing elsewhere. In addition, even within states
with such statutes, entities willing to bend the
rules will gain over those choosing to comply
strictly with the law.' 0
Supporters of the state laws present a dif-
ferent scenario. They argue that encouraging
companies to self-audit leads to greater envi-
ronmental compliance and minimizes business
uncertainties. Additionally, proponents main-
tain, using the results of an audit that was vol-
untarily conducted and disclosed to penalize
the auditor deters voluntary compliance and
casts a pall over the business climate."
The resulting conflict between EPA and the
states has generated a flurry of "nastygrams"
sent by the Agency to various states,12 threaten-
ing to suspend or withhold a state's ability to
implement federal pollution laws.13 In other
cases, EPA has simply asked for clarification
and assurance from the states that their audit
laws would not interfere with their enforcement
capability.'
4
This Article examines the evolution of EPA'S
audit policy, explores the reasons for states' dis-
satisfaction with it, and then discusses whether
the federal policy should have been issued as a
rule under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).i5 Part I examines the evolution of the
federal audit policy and then analyzes the
strengths and weaknesses of the policy in its
10. See 1995 Minn. Law 168 §§ 8. 10.
11. See, e.g., State Official Promotes Flexibility of
Pennsylvania SeV-Audit Plan, Business Publishers, Inc,, Solid
Waste Report, April 4, 1996, available in LEXIS. Environ
Library (discussing the head of Pennsylvania's
Department of Environmental Protection's support for the
state's plan to refrain from penalizing companies that dis-
cover violations dunng compliance audits). Letter from
Richard Graves, Flonda Chamber of Commerce, to the
editors, ST. PETERSBURG TiMEs, April 6, 1996, available in
LEXIS. Nexis Library. Cumnews file (arguing that Florida's
self-audit legislation is -known as the 'Find It, Fix It' bill
because that's precisely what it encourages the finding
and fixing of small environmental problems before they
become big ones"); see also lennifer Arlen. The Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Cnrminal Liability. 23 1. LEGAL STUD
833, 833-37 (1994) (discussing how liability for violations
found through internal auditing will reduce auditing
rather than violations).
12. States receiving nastygrams include California.
Colorado and Idaho. The nastygrams seemed designed to
current form Part I! explores various types of
evidentiary privilege and looks at the arguments
for and against extending the privilege to audit
reports. It then offers a similar analysis of the
case for limited immunity, concluding that nei-
ther an expanded privilege nor immunity is nec-
essary to encourage compliance audits, and
that both provisions can seriously undermine
the public's right to know and the Agency s law
enforcement abilities Part IIl clarifies the dis-
tinction between policies and rules under the
APA in order to determine whether EPA's audit
policy is actually a rule in disguise-
The Article concludes that the federal audit
policy offers sufficient enticements to industry
to self-audit The overall goal of both the state
and federal policies should be heightened com-
pliance with environmental laws Yet, state
statutes bedeck the audit process with incen-
tives to the point where companies potentially
could gain more by auditing than through com-
plying with the law Such laws treat audits as an
end in themselves This is a dangerous trend.
Business uncertainties concerning the interpre-
tation and impact of environmental laws should
be allayed through compliance rather than
through audits alone. The federal audit policy,
unadorned by privilege or immunity clauses,
does not hallow audits, but offers only limited
incentives as part of an overall policy of encour-
aging lawful behavior
serve notice that the EPA would frown on pn'Jege anJ
immunity legislation enacted by the states See Enviro
Auditing EPA Opposition Squelche; Some State Bilt Greenwi re
June 12, 1996, available in LEXIS. Environ Library
13 Some supporters of the state initatv es have
scoffed at EPAs threat, calling it 'h2o1[ow fames 0 Re~ly,
corporate counsel for Pri-tor & Gamble remarked that in
light of federal budget realities 'EPA probablyw ould be
unable to operate a complex permitting program through
its regional offices EPA Says State Immunity Pnitge LgeaL
May Undermine Air Act Enforcement PAers Daily
Environment Reporter April 15 1996, avalabKe in LEXIS,
Environ Library For informat(on regarding EPAs strategi:
use of inspection resources U S EPA Enforcement in t,4e
1990s Pro;ect 4-59 to 4-63 11991)
14 For a discussion of state self-audit statutes and
EPAs response to the various laws, see State lmmunitu
Privilege Laws Examined for Conflicts Affecting Delegated
Programs. Daily Environment Report Sep 18. 1996 avaita be
in LEXIS, Environ Library
15 5USC § 553 11994)
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Perhaps even more importantly, a rule
mandating an administrative enforcement pro-
cedure would create far more problems than it
would solve. Agencies have enormous discre-
tion over when to institute enforcement
actions. That discretion is both court-defined
and salutary. 16 Agencies are far better
equipped than the courts to decide when and
how to expend their enforcement resources. 17
A rule setting out the requirements for enforce-
ment actions would obligate the Agency to
meet those requirements when deciding
whether or not to enforce. Additionally, it
would create the potential for boundless litiga-
tion because defendants could litigate every
facet of the rule's enforcement prerequisites.
The federal audit policy also does not
appear to be a camouflaged rule which should
have undergone a rulemaking in accordance
with the APA.I8 Neither the APA, nor the courts,
have created a definitive test for differentiating
policies from rules. Therefore, it is difficult to
state with certainty that the audit policy should
not be sublect to a rulemaking. Nevertheless,
the policy survives both a Force of Law and a
Substantial Impacts analysis, 19 the two extant
judicial tests for determining whether a policy
is actually a rule in disguise. Recently, EPA has
also demonstrated a growing sensitivity to the
nuances differentiating policies from rules.
Considered in the aggregate, these factors
make a strong case that the audit policy need
not undergo a rulemaking procedure, nor
should it.
16. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)
["This Court has recognized on several occasions over
many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or
enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a
decision generally committed to an agency's absolute dis-
cretion."J.
17. See id.
18. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) (1994).
19. See Aman & Mayton, infra note 93,and accompa-
nying text.
20. Interim Policy Statement, supra note 1, at
16,877
21. Industries may institute numerous other meth-
II. Development of EPA's Environmental
Audit Policy
EPA defines an environmenIal audit as "a
systematic, documented, periodic and objec-
tive review by regulated entities of facility
operations and practices related to meeting
environmental requirements' 20 ,udits consti-
tute one facet of a larger environmental man-
agement scheme, 21 offering periodic, or occa-
sional inspections designed to identify exist-
ing areas of noncompliance and facilitate
their correction. Audits can also help locate
areas of employee noncompliance, thereby
encouraging increased attentiveness among
the rank and file.
In theory, self-audits reduce business
fears and enhance government monitoring
capabilities by enlisting the aid of the regu-
lated entities themselves. The Agency gains
because it can husband its thinly stretched
enforcement resources. Regulated entities
benefit because they can catch violations
before they become too serious (and some-
times before they even occur), thereby sparing
themselves potentially severe penalties The
public benefits because increased compliance
with environmental laws brings accompany-
ing improvements in public health and the
environment. And last, companies already in
compliance gain through the establishment of
a level playing field in which to do business.
Though EPA issued its first authoritative
policy on environmental audits in 198o.22
industries have long recognized that volun-
tary compliance audits often serve their best
ods for ensuring environmental compliance The dralt
federal sentencing guidelines for corpolate environmen-
tal crimes suggest, among other tactics, continuou-. on-
site monitoring, by specifically trained compllance per-
sonnel and by other means," as well as regular and ongo.
ing employee training and incentives Advisory Group on
Environmental Sanctions, U S Sentnricing Comm'n,
Environmental Guidelines for Oraanizations, § 9DI I(a)(3)(iil)
(Nov, 16, 1993 Draft), reprinted in Oraanizna for Corporate
Compliance: Toward Standards, CI I0 ALI-ABA 283, 102-03
(Mar. 1995); see also Dana, supra note 5 at 975 & n 23
22. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51
Fed. Reg. 25,004 (1986) The Agency did, however, publish
an interim policy statement in November, 1985 See 50
Fed, Reg, 46,504 (1985)
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interests. 23 Audits provide industry with an early
warning system through which to detect exist-
ing and potential environmental violations,
Managers can identify and remediate incipient
problems, minimizing environmental impacts.
and reducing the probability of civil or criminal
enforcement actions. They can also redesign
oversight and management systems to avoid
future violations. In addition, audits can play an
important role in avoiding citizen suits by pro-
viding information that goes beyond mere com-
pliance data concerning nonregulatory environ-
mental, health and safety problems.
24
In EPA's 1986 audit policy, the Agency
sought to encourage environmental self-audits
and stated that it would not routinely request
copies of the audit reports. 25 It also indicated
that facilities with self-audit systems in place
would be subject to fewer inspections.2 6 While
the 1986 policy demonstrated the Agency's pref-
erence that facilities conduct self-audits, aside
from its unquantified promise of "fewer inspec-
tions," however, it offered little in the way of
tangible encouragement to do so. In effect, the
Agency asked regulated entities that elected to
self-audit to simply trust that the audit results
would not be used against them.
Though EPA stated that it would not rou-
tinely demand copies of audit reports, it
reserved the right to request them whenever
necessary2 7 Furthermore, despite its stated
preference for self-audits, EPA declined to alter
its enforcement response based on whether a
facility self-audited.2 8 In short, though the 1986
policy defined a clear Agency preference and
hinted at Agency cooperation, it failed to make
self-auditing sufficiently attractive to regulated
entities.29 Because it did not create explicit
Agency guidelines, the policy did not provide
companies with any degree of certainty while
23. See Terrell Hunt & Timothy Wilkins,
Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy, 16 HAP. Ew%'ri. L
REv. 365, 371 (1992).
24. See id.
25. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement,




leaving them exposed to substantial enforce-
ment actions
A. The Intenm Policy
In 1995, EPA announced a new, Interim
Policy designed to provide incentives for enti-
ties to self-audit 3? Companies that self-audited
and met certain conditions would enjoy
reduced civil penalties and a commitment from
the Agency not to refer the case to the
Department of Justice for criminal prosecu-
tion 31 Conditions for lessened Agency response
included
I Voluntary self-policing-regulated
entity must discover the violation
through a voluntary audit or self-evalu-
ation rather than through statutory
obligation
2 Voluntary disclosure-entity must
disclose the violation to the appropri-
ate state and federal agencies as soon
as it is discovered
3 Prompt correction-violation must
be corrected within sixty days or, if more
time is needed, as expeditiously as pos-
sible
4 Remediation of imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment-entity must
promptly remediate any condition
which may cause imminent and sub-
stantial harm to humans or the envi-
ronment
5 Remediation of harm and preven-
tion of repeat violations
6- No lack of appropriate preventive
measures-violation cannot indicate
that entity failed to take appropriate
steps to avoid repeat or recurring viola-
tions
29 See DaYid S,:rerisn Crnment Tie U S
Enirenmenul Prc!mAe.n L , eent Em r',nunenL ,Auaditi-
Policy an . Pl!enril C001L';At State-Creare4 Enwronmenal
Audit Pni! e LaA. QT- E'..T L I 4S3 48u9Q6s eeaLo,
Hunt & WdIhs iurra n te 23 at 36 G Van Vesor Woflf,
Ir Se f-kuJd Pm4 e3 ae,.1 Di:.L,:ure SBi8 ALI-ABk 537 543
30 See Interim Poi:i Sta!ternet zupra note i, at
16,875
31 See i at Io877-78
David N. Cossulo Volume 5, Number 3
7 Cooperation-entity must cooper-
ate as required by EPA and provide
such information as is necessary to
determine applicability of the policy.
32
The reduced civil penalties included EPA's
commitment to seek recovery of only the eco-
nomic benefit gained through noncompli-
ance 33 rather than "gravity-based" penalties
34
from entities which met all the requirements
set forth in the policy.35 The Agency further
agreed to lessen gravity-based penalties by 75
percent in cases where most but not all of the
conditions are met.
36
The Interim Policy expressed EPA's strong
opposition to state statutes granting various
forms of immunity to entities performing self-
audits and/or privileging the results of those
audits. 37 In the Agency's view, such privileges
and immunities, "could be used to shield crim-
inal misconduct, drive up litigation costs and
create an atmosphere of distrust between reg-
ulators, industry, and local communities." 38 In
addition, EPA maintained that, since the prin-
cipal rationale for self-audit statutes lay in lim-
iting the exposure of entities that conduct self-
audits and act on their findings, and since the
Interim Policy addressed these concerns, state
self-audit statutes that exceeded EPA's policy
32. Id. at 16,877
33. See Interim Policy Statement, supra note 1. at
16,877 The agency's purpose in recovering economic ben-
efits was to "preserve a level playing field in which viola-
tors do not gain a competitive advantage through non-
compliance." Id.
34. Gravity-based penalties are those that exceed
the amount necessary to recover any economic benefit
the violator might have reaped as a result of the violation.
See Sorenson, supra note 29 at n.25.
35. The potential savings to the regulated entity
arising from its escaping gravity-based penalties can be
substantial. For example, GTE Corporation recently dis-
closed and resolved 600 violations at 314 facilities in 21
states. The settlement between GTE and EPA requires the
company to pay a $52,264 penalty intended to offset the
economic gain acquired through noncompliance.
Because GTE disclosed and remediated according to the
audit policy, however, EPA waived another $2.8 million in
gravity-based penalties. See "GTE Corrects 600 Violations
Through EPPs Self-Disclosure Policy," AUDIT POLICY UPDATE,
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. VOLUME 3
No. 1, Mar. 1998 (on file with author).
served only to hinder enforcement efforts, 39
Consequently, the Agency stated its intention
to "scrutinize enforcement more closely" in
states with self-audit statutes and to increase
federal enforcement where the Agency
believed the statutes interfered with a state's
ability to meet federal requiiements for
enforcement and protecting the citizenry.
40
B. The Final Policy
EPA invited response to the Interim Policy
from the public, industry, public interest
groups and state officials.4 1 In December, 1095,
the Agency released its final policy state-
ment.42 Among industrys chief concerns with
the Interim Policy had been the parameters of
"voluntary" reports and "voluntary" audits
43 It
was not clear, for example, whether violations
discovered as part of an entity's due diligence
qualified for penalty mitigation. The Final
Policy Statement attempted to address indus-
try complaints by clarifying the definition of
voluntary disclosure and stating that certain
monitoring efforts, which were arguably not
"voluntary," including an entity's due diligence,
would not per se disqualify an entity from
penalty mitigation. 44  The Final Policy
Statement also clarified the requ rements for
waiver or diminution of gravity-based penal-
36. See Interim Policy Statement, supra note I, at
16,877
37 See id. at 16,878.
38. Id.
39. See id. The Interim Policy Statement argued that
granting additional privileges and immunity to self-audi-
tors would undermine efforts to open up environmental
decisionmaking to public scrutiny, shield bad actors and
conceal crucial information and increase litigation as
opposing sides battled over what was and was not privi-
leged or immune
40. See id; see also, Enforcement: Lower Penalties Seen bu
Enforcement Chief Under Upcoming EPA Policy on Companu
Audits, 25 ENV'T REP (BNA) 2379 (Mar 31, 1995),
41. See Interim Policy Statement, suipra note I, at
16,875.
42. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at
66,706.
43. See Wolf, supra note 29 at 543.
44. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at
66,708.
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ties, refining the language of the Interim Policy
and in the process expanding the list of pre-
requisites from seven to nine:
1. Violation must have been discov-
ered pursuant to an environmental
audit or other systematic procedure.
2. Regulated entity must have discov-
ered the violation voluntarily-not
through a legally mandated monitoring
program.
3. The entity must disclose violations
within ten days of its discovery.
4. Disclosure must precede any
Agency action or citizen suit.
5 Entity must correct the violation
within sixty days or notify the Agency
in writing as to why it will take longer.
6. Entity must agree in writing to
institute measures to prevent recur-
rence.
7 Same or similar violation cannot
have occurred at the facility within the
last three years, nor can it be part of a
pattern of violations by parent organi-
zation over previous five years.
8. Violation must not have resulted in
serious harm or imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to human
health or the environment, nor can it
have violated the terms of any judicial
order or consent agreement.
9 Entity must cooperate with EPA by
providing informatior and access to
employees.
45
If an entity does not discover the violation
through an audit or similar procedure, but sat-
isfies the remaining criteria, EPA will reduce
gravity-based penalties by 75 percent.4
45. Id. at 66.712.
46. See id. at 66,711. The language concerning
reducing gravity-based penalties represented a substan-
tial improvement in clarity from the Interim Policy
Statement. Whereas the Final Policy stated that the
penalties would be reduced 75 percent if the entity satis-
fied conditions 2-9, the Intenm Policy had said that penal-
ties may be reduced "up to" 75 percent where 'most' con-
ditions were met. Id. at 66,707.
47. See id.
The Final Policy Statement also declares
that EPA will not recommend cases for crimi-
nal prosecution if violators meet the nine
requirements listed above, and their manage-
ment does not show a conscious involvement
with, or willful blindness to, the violations.
47
And, as with the Interim Policy, the Agency
declared that it would not routinely request or
use audit reports to initiate investigations.
though it reserved the right to request the
reports if it gains independent knowledge of a
violation_43 If, for example. EPA learned
through a tip from a company employee or
through some other form of monitoring that a
company that had recently completed an audit
was out of compliance, the Agency could
request the audit results as part of its enforce-
ment effort.
Though the Final Policy Statement elimi-
nates much of the uncertainty and confusion
arising from the Interim Policy, critics complain
that several crucial issues remain unresolved
and that the Final Policy Statement fails to pro-
vide any significant relief to regulated indus-
tries 4" First, the line between gravity-based
penalties (the punitive portion of the fine) and
recovery of any economic benefit reaped from
the violation (the "level playing field" compo-
nent) is far from clear. Second, though EPA
declares that it may decline to seek any recov-
ery where the economic gain is "insignificant,"
it does not specify what "insignificant amount"
means.5
Third, perhaps the most significant flaw in
the Final Policy Statement, according to one
commentator, lies in its failure to elaborate
how entities that self-audit would be protected
from third-party suits. If an entity self-audits
and discloses the information, it could then face
exposure to toxic tort suits or, in a more likely
48. See id
49 See, e g Wolf, supra note 29, at 545, Clinton I
Elliott, Kentuckys Environmental Self-Audzi Pnvdege State
Protection or Increased Federal Scruinyl, 23 N KY L RE; 1, 12
(1995)l Ronald E Cardwell, Self-Audit Act An IncentLVe fLr
Voluntary Compliance? 8-Oct S C Law 38, 41-42 (1996)
50 See wolf, supra note 29 at 545 An agency source
who wishes to remain anonymous notes, however, that
six figures is a good rule of thumb-
David N. Cassuta Volume 5, Number 3
scenario, to potentially devastating citizen
enforcement suits filed by public interest
groups.51 Suits in tort require a showing of harm
and accompanying proof of causation. But pro-
bative showings of harm and causation are
often difficult, especially because not all viola-
tions result in harm and even when they do, it is
often difficult to link conclusively the violation
to the harm. Citizen enforcement suits, by con-
trast, require no such showing of harm; the only
harm they need to prove is the existence of the
violation itself.52 Consequently, the specter of
such suits, which often call for civil penalties
and attorney's fees, as well as requiring a costly
defense, can be sobering to a company consid-
ering a voluntary compliance audit.
First, the Final Policy Statement declines to
specify EPA's methodology for determining eco-
nomic benefit for a given violation. Generally,
however, the Agency utilizes the BEN model for
determining economic benefit.' 3 While EPA
does not specify whether it intends to apply
BEN to all laws and violations,' 4 this seems a
minor problem and one that is easily remedied
either through querying the Audit Policy Quick
Response Team (ORT) 55 or during the Agency's
follow-up studies. 56
The second criticism is of the Agency's fail-
ure to specify the precise amount of economic
benefit that would spur the Agency to attempt
recovery and is even less valid. Entities audit to
51. See id. at 546; Elliott, supra note 49 at 14-15
(audit documents subject to public review "may provide a
wealth of information for environmental organizations
and public interest groups acting as private attorneys
general").
52. The violation must be present or demonstrably
imminent, however, past violations do not suffice for
standing in citizen suits. See Steel Company v. Citizens for
a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), 1998 WL 8804
(US. III) at *13-14 (1998),
53. BEN is a computer modeling method that esti-
mates the economic benefit gained by a company through
its failure to comply with environmental regulations.
Among the criteria used in making the determination are
the cost of obtaining the necessary permits; time spent
out of compliance; the required capital investment; and
the interest on capital gained during noncompliance. For
further information on the BEN model, see EPA Office of
Compliance Assurance (OECA) website at (visited May 14,
1999) http://es.epa.gov/oeca/models/ben.html.
54. See Wolf, supra note 29 at 545 (arguing that with
correct existing and potential violations, head
off enforcement measures, and minimize the
risk of accident, injury, costly litiga:ion and bad
public relations. If an entity decides not to self-
audit out of concern that EPA will seek to recov-
er economic benefits, two likely conclusions can
be extrapolated: (1) the entity has committed a
violation that has brought it a sizable illicit
return (otherwise the specter of losing those
benefits would not offer cause for concern); and
(2) since minor compliance violations are rarely
the source of large ill-gotten gains, the violation
or violations were likely of a serious nature.
Given the probable seriousness of the trans-
gressions, the gravity-based penalties arising
from an Agency enforcement action could great-
ly outweigh any economic benefit gained
through the violation. This is particularly true
because the risk that the Agency will take an
enforcement action for minor violations is min-
imal, whereas it is much more likely to invest
the time and resources to penalize significant
violations. Therefore, even without: the added
shield of privilege or immunity statutes, compa-
nies with major violations (or the potential
thereof) have the most to gain from the audit
policy and its concomitant protections. 7
Delineating precisely what constitutes a
"significant" economic gain would remove the
Agencys discretion to differentiate between larg-
er and smaller entities that have committed vio-
some statutes, such as FIFRA, it is uncleai whether BEN
applies).
55 The ORT is comprised of members of each
maior media enforcement program, as well as the
Department of justice and representatives of each EPA
region. It is chaired by the Office of Regulatory
Enforcement within the EPA Office of Regulatory
Enforcement (OECA). The ORT's stated mission is to
"expeditiously, fairly, and consistently resolve nationally
significant issues involving application of the audit policy
in specific cases." Audit Policy Update (EPA Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance), Jan. 1997 at 3,
56. EPA has committed itself to conducting a fol-
low-up study within three years of the is,;uance of the
Final Policy Statement to determine the policy's effective-
ness. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at 66,706.
57 This is provided, of course, that the agency cor-
rectly assesses the economic benefit gainei through the
violation. If the EPA incorrectly assesses the benefit, the
cost to the violator could be much higher or lower
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lations, as well as among the violations them-
selves. A $10,000 violation might mean nothing
to a large oil company, but it would likely matter
a great deal to a small dry cleaner. The Agency
currently has discretion to consider the ratio of
the cost of compliance to the environmental
benefit/risk. Insisting that the Agency decree
exactly what constitutes a significant amount
would eliminate its flexibility in individual cases,
while offering a benefit of questionable worth.
Furthermore, if EPA revealed the dollar
amount at which they would initiate enforce-
ment, that would create a pernicious reverse
incentive. Entities could break the law with rela-
tive impunity as long as their transgressions did
not bring them the specified amount of econom-
ic gain. That freedom to infract points to poor
strategy by the enforcing Agency. Just as the
police do not publish the number of miles over
the posted speed limit at which they start ticket-
ing, so too would a parallel tactic prove counter-
productive for EPA. It bears noting that though
the police do not state their policy for speeders.
people know that they will almost never get tick-
eted for small amounts over the speed limit.
Similarly, in the environmental arena, small vio-
lations are de facto tolerated, but the uncertainty
over when enforcement begins helps to maintain
acceptable compliance levels.
Another problem with specifying the precise
amount of the economic gain that the Agency
would deem significant lies in the fact that doing
so would come perilously close to a rule rather
than a policy.58 Setting a specific level of gain and
specifying a precise Agency response does far
more than merely suggest the policy that the
58. See, e.g.. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young,
818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (disallowing FDA policy defin-
ing maximum aflatoxin levels in food because the policy
was couched in mandatory terms and therefore had the
effect of a rule).
59. See id. at 945-48; U.S. Telephone Ass'n v Fed
Communications Comm'n. 28 F3d 1232, 1234 (D.C- Cir
1994) (finding that FCC penalty schedule setting base for-
feiture amounts for violations -does not fit the paradigm
of a policy statement").
60. See Dana, supra note 5, at 978 ("Corporations
cannot be assumed to choose the mix of management
options that maximize environmental compliance and
well-being unless it is in their financial interest to do
so."); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell. Cooperation and Constraint
Agency might apply in an adjudication, It creates
a rule of conduct and sets a mandatory Agency
response. Consequently, defining the precise
nature of a violation and mandating a particular
Agency response would probably require a rule-
making, rather than lust the issuance of a guid-
ance document'59 Since it makes little sense from
an enforcement standpoint to attach a specific
dollar figure to "significant amount," it seems
wholly ill-advised to force the Agency to instigate
a rulemaking on this issue.
The third complaint, that without privileging
audit results, entities performing self-audits
open themselves up to potentially damaging tort
and citizen enforcement suits, demands a more
rigorous inquiry The predicate of this criticism
seems skewed The violation, not the self-audit,
creates grounds for civil suit- A self-audit merely
brings the violation to light in a manner designed
to mitigate Agency enforcement
We must assume that the entity believes that
the violation will eventually come to light even
without an audit- If not, the entire argument over
whether to protect self-audits becomes moot
because there is no incentive to perform one, If
the regulated entity can violate environmental
laws with impunity, then it need not fear Agency
enforcement or citizen enforcement suits and
self-audits become pointless- Rather than audit
and potentially lose the economic benefits ans-
Ing from its violations, the entity would more
likely continue to violate and thereby also con-
tinue reaping the windfall profits stemming from
its misconduct 61 One can also imagine a cycle of
steadily worsening behavior whereby an entity
violates to enormous financial gain, commis-
in the Modern Corporation An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate
Immorality, 73 TAs L Rv. 477, 479-92 (1995)
61 But see vilations Di losed Under Immunity Law
Would Have Eluded Texas. O servers Agree, Daily Environment
Report, April 24, 1996 Idiscussing how companies con-
ducting audits under shield of the states new self-audit
law are turning up violations that would have gone unde-
tected by state regulators) it bears noting however that
state agencies do not have the resources or personneltf
the federal EPA Violations that may have escaped state
inspectors may eventually have been caught at the feder-
al level Or, the violations might eventually have led to an
illegal andfor harmful release that would have incurred
not lust the wrath of the Agency but a rash of citizen suits
as well
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sions an audit to gain immunity for its past
actions, and then begins the cycle again, this
time violating different laws.
Regulated entities uncertain about wheth-
er they are complying with environmental laws
must choose between two difficult alternatives:
(1) gamble that EPA will not discover the viola-
tion independently and impose the full brunt
of the available economic and possibly crimi-
nal penalties; or (2) conduct a self-audit, dis-
close any violations, and reach a settlement
with the Agency. This course of action would
reduce economic penalties62 and likely remove
the threat of criminal prosecution as well.
63
Once the violation stands revealed, the
violator may find itself the target of private civil
suits. Yet, to structure the audit policy so as to
shield violators from civil suits by granting
immunity to and/or privileging the results of
audits,64 seems counter to EPA's mandate to
protect the public and the environment.65, For
an entity to complain that the federal enforce-
ment policy fails to shield it from the com-
plaints of injured parties (in tort suits) seems
akin to a criminal grousing because his plea
bargain does not protect him from civil suits.
The fear that reporting audit results will
expose entities to civil suit also seems over-
stated. Since tort suits require significant
harm, anyone who had experienced such harm
would undoubtedly seek to learn its cause and
would have a great deal of information at her
disposal.66 Furthermore, prompt reporting and
correction of a violation would go far towards
mitigating civil liability by eliminating the
62. See Sorenson, supra note 29 at 489.
63. See Audit Policy Update (EPA Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance), January 1997,
at 3 (noting that the decision not to charge at least three
companies with environmental crimes arising from their
voluntary disclosure of violations, "stemmed from the
considerations expressly set forth in the Audit Policy.").
64. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at
66,710 (outlining EPA's opposition to state laws that priv-
ilege the results of environmental audits).
65. See, e.g., id. (purpose of the policy is to "enhance
protection of human health and the environment by
encouraging regulated entities to voluntarily discover,
disclose, correct and prevent violations of federal envi-
ronmental requirements").
point source of any contamination before it
causes harm or, at a minimum, before it caus-
es further harm.
Also, a recent Supreme Court decision has
effectively eliminated standing for citizen
enforcement suits in cases where the govern-
ment has taken an enforcement action. 67 The
Court held that neither vindication of the rule
of law without cognizable injury, nor past ille-
gal conduct, nor the unsubstantiated threat of
future injury, satisfy the redressability require-
ment for Article Ill standing.6 8
Citizen enforcement suits routinely seek to
penalize wrongdoers by seeking statutory dam-
ages. A successful citizen suit therefore swells
the coffers of the federal treasury more than it
benefits the citizen litigant(s). The Court's clar-
ification of the redressability standard elimi-
nates standing in these instances. 69
Further, the illegal conduct presumably
ceases once an Agency enforcement action
occurs. If so, there is no present or looming
future injury and therefore no standing. 70
Requiring that an entity disgorge the econom-
ic benefit gained through noncompliance (as
mandated by the audit policy) constitutes an
Agency enforcement action. Consequently, if
an entity self-audits, discloses the results,
remedies the discovered violations, and then
pays the penalty mandated by the Agency, it
gains a shield from citizen suits, The Court's
clarification of the redressability standard
eliminates standing in these instances. 71
An interesting situation may arise when
the economic benefit from a violation is insuf-
66. See, e.g., the Toxic Release Inventory, available
online at, (last modified Mar 31, 1998) <wwwepa.gov/
enviro/html/tris/trisquery-lava html, as weil as the infor-
mation that would normally become available through
civil discovery.
67 See, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), 1998 WL 8804 (U.S Il1) at
* 13-14 (1998) ("It is an immense and unacceptable stretch
to call the presumption lof future inluryl Into service as a
substitute for the allegation of present or threatened
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ficiently large to merit an enforcement action.
Following an audit, a company might wish to
enter into a settlement agreement with EPA,
despite the Agency s apparent lack of interest,
in order to defuse the risk of a citizen suit. The
Agency enforcement action would actually
work to the polluter's benefit by quashing the
deterrent power of a potential citizen enforce-
ment suit.
Even assuming that the government
should lessen the potential liability of entities
that disclose and correct violations through
self-audits, the incentives offered in the Final
Policy Statement do lust that. In addition to
the protection from citizen enforcement suits
gained via Agency enforcement actions, the
Agency's mitigated response to violations dis-
covered through voluntary audits72 encourages
industries to periodically scrutinize their
behavior. That scrutiny enables prompt discov-
ery and remediation of current violations as
well as the avoidance of potential future prob-
lems. Entities can self-correct before their
actions injure the public, thereby heading off
possible tort suits as well as creating a climate
of good will among the citizenry.
3
Lastly, concern about confidentiality does
not appear to play much of a role in industry
decisions concerning self-audits. 74  The
absence of protection from third party suits
has not deterred industry from self-auditing. A
1995 Price Waterhouse survey found that,
among the few large or mid-sized companies
that have elected not to self-audit, concern
about confidentiality was not a significant fac-
tor in their decision.7 ' Their reasons were pri-
marily economic.
72. Final Policy Statement, supra note 2. at 66,706
(summanzing incentives to self-audit),
73. Compare Gail S. Port, Does EPA Policy Really Provide
Protection? NEw YORK LAW JOURNAL. June 12. 1995 (public
interest groups that are unsatisfied with agency response
or the efforts to remedy the violation may still elect to
sue. even after a company has voluntarily disclosed and
attempted to correct a violation). Suits can only be filed.
however, if the company's efforts to correct the problem
have failed.
74. See Testimony of Steven Herman, supra note 8,
("ISlurveys on audit practices and our discussions with
111. Privileges and Immunities
As mentioned above, despite EPAs efforts
to fashion the Final Policy Statement to meet
state concerns, many states remain unsatisfied
with the federal audit policy. Eighteen states
have passed laws granting various levels of evi-
dentiary privilege to audit reports as well as in
some cases, allowing immunity for the violator,
State audit statutes fall generally into two cate-
gories. (I) statutes offering a qualified privilege
and no immunity (most state statutes fall into
this category), and (2) statutes offering both a
qualified privilege and immunity 76 This section
looks at the legal and policy reasoning behind
an evidentiary privilege and immunity.
A. Privilege
Legislatures, both at the state and federal
level, can create new privileges through statute.
For the most part, however. Congress and the
state legislatures have been chary of shielding
information from the judicial and administrative
process that the courts have not already shield-
ed through common law evidentiary privilege.
According to Wigmore, four conditions must be
met in order to justify a judicial privilege-
I The communications must origi-
nate in a confidence that they they will not
be disclosed
2. This element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory main-
tenance of the relation between the par-
ties.
3. The relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered.
stakeholders convinced us that any'chilling effect' that
our enforcement policies had on self-auditing has been
more than offset by existing incentives to have a compre-
hensive auditing program -)
75 See Voluntary Environmental Audit Survey of U S
Business, Price Waterhouse LLP IMarch 1995) at 47 [here-
inafter 'Price Waterhouse Survey'l, see also Final Poli.y
Statement, supra note 2. at 66,710 fcting survey as e.i-
dence in opposition to state laws granting pnvilege or
immunity)
76 See Sorenson. supra note 29, at 491
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4. The injury that would inure to the
relation by the disclosure of the com-
munication must be greater than the bene-
fit thereby gained for the correct dispos-
al of the litigation.77
In deciding whether to extend a privilege,
courts must balance the competing policy con-
siderations of complete disclosure of relevant
facts and the public interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of certain communications. In
general, courts have shown a marked reluc-
tance to create new privileges.78 There currently
exist three evidentiary precedents for privileg-
ing the results of audits: attorney-client privi-
lege, self-critical analysis, and the work product
doctrine. As several commentators have shown,
none of these extant doctrines comfortably
encompass a proposed audit privilege.
79
B. Immunity
Several state self-audit laws provide both
civil and criminal immunity to companies that
disclose violations in accordance with state
guidelines.80 Without immunity, even if the
evaluative information of an audit were privi-
leged, government investigators could use dis-
covery to gain access to the factual information
contained in the audit. Consider the Arkansas
privilege statute, if a state pollution control
Agency has independent information giving it
probable cause to believe an environmental
offens, has been committed, it can obtain a
copy of an audit report. (1) under a search war-
rant, (2) under a subpoena; or (3) through dis-
77 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2285 (McNaughten rev.
1961) (emphasis in original).
78. See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S.
182, 189 (1990) (acknowledging that, while the Federal
Rules of Evidence "provide the courts with flexibility to
develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis, we
are disinclined to exercise this authority expansively").
79. See Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 23, at 377-402;
Sorenson, supra note 29, at 490-500.
80. Those states are: Idaho, 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws.
359; Kansas, 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 204; Minnesota, 1995
Minn. Laws 168; Texas, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 219; Virginia,
Va. Code Ann. § 10.1-1198 (1995); and Wyoming, Wyo.
Stat. § 35-11-1105, 1106 (Mitchie 1998). it bears noting,
however, that Idaho's law sunsets in 1998 and the gover-
nor has recently agreed not to seek its renewal. Telephone
covery.81 If the Agency uncovers evidence of a
violation it can seek penalties.
By contrast, immunity statutes provide
auditing entities with complete protection from
penalty. For example, Wyoming's statute states,
"If an owner or operator of a facility regulated
under this act voluntarily reports tc the depart-
ment a violation disclosed by the audit the
department shall not seek civil penalties or
inlunctive relief for the violation reported "82
The law goes on to list four caveats, excluding
from immunity violations where:
i) the facility is under investigation for
any violation of this act at the time the
violation is reported;
(ii) the owner or operator does not take
action to eliminate the violation within
the time frame specified in an order
affirmed by the council or otherwise
made final pursuant to W.S. 35-11-
701 (c)(ii);
(iii) the violation is the result of gross
negligence or recklessness; or
(iv) the department has assumed pri-
macy over a federally delegated envi-
ronmental law and a waiver of penalty
authority would result in a stzite pro-
gram less stringent than the federal
program or the waiver would violate
any federal rule or regulation required
to maintain state primacy.83
Other state laws vary in language and scope,84
but all offer some form of immunity from civil
Interview with Brian Riedel, U.S EPA, Vice Chair (Office of
Planning and Policy Analysis), Office of Enforcement and
Compliance & Editor, EPA Audit Policy Update (April 5
1997) Ihereinafter Riedel Interviewl In addition, EPA Is
currently negotiating with Texas to remove the criminal
immunity provision from its audit law Id.
81. See ARK. CODE ANN, § 8-1-309(a) (Mitchie 1907)
(proceeding to obtain environmental audit report)
82. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1106 (a) (Mitchle 1997).
83. Id.
84. Minnesota's law, for example, institutes a pilot
program for voluntary compliance. Participation is limited
to regulated entities that have not been the sublect of an
enforcement action resulting in a penalty for at least one
year previous to their enrollment, See 1995 Minn. Law 168
§§8, 10.
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and/or criminal prosecution to companies that
disclose violations in compliance with the
statutory guidelines.
Granting statutory immunity to entities
that voluntarily disclose violations raises many
similar policy issues to audit privilege.
Immunity allows polluters to benefit from their
misdeeds without fear of prosecution, 85 while
creating the potential for uneven enforce-
ment.86 In a state with a privilege and immuni-
ty regime an entity could disclose and remedy
only one of the several violations it discovered
during an audit. It would gain immunity from
any penalty for that violation while keeping the
rest of the audit information privileged. In this
way the entity would look like a good corporate
citizen while continuing to reap the benefits of
its remaining violations. By contrast, an entity
in a state without a privilege and/or immunity
statute would have to disclose the full results
of any audits and face any penalties arising
from all the violations discovered during the
audit process.
Further, by making it more attractive to cor-
rect noncompliance, audit immunity diminish-
es corporate incentive to prevent noncompli-
ance in the first place.87 Since corporations
earn a return on all current assets, they would
clearly prefer to defer low-return expenditures
like pollution technology for as long as possi-
ble. Without immunity, a company considering
delaying its investment in pollution control
technology must weigh: (1) the risk of substan-
tial economic and gravity-based penalties if it
gets caught, and (2) the costs of disgorging its
economic gains and installing new technology
at potentially higher prices (if it audits and dis-
closes the violation with the intent of remedy-
ing the problem).
85. See Testimony of Steven Herman, supra note 8
Testifying against a proposed immunity provision at the
federal level, Herman noted that -the penalty immunity
provision in the bill gives violators an economic advan-
tage over their law-abiding competitors. ITIo maintain
a level playing field, the federal and state governments
must be able to recoup the economic benefit of viola-
tions--even inadvertent ones that are discovered volun-
tarily" Id.
86. See Interim Policy Statement. supra note 1. at
16.878.
Companies residing in states with immuni-
ty statutes no longer need worry about relin-
quishing the economic benefits gained
through noncompliance They must only
assess the odds of getting caught before con-
ducting an audit against the substantial wind-
fall they stand to reap through noncompliance
coupled with the immunity they stand to gain
through their eventual audit Assuming the
existence of an immunity statute and given the
dwindling government resources devoted to
environmental enforcement, engaging in a
cycle of violation and compliance audits rather
than investing in prevention appears to make
good economic sense 8 Given this counterpro-
ductive effect on pollution control, the advis-
ability of immunity statutes bears serious
reevaluation s8
IV. Is EPA Policy on Self-Audits A Rule in
Disguise?
One of the major complaints leveled by
industry at EPAs audit policy was that it is
actually a disguised rule that should have
undergone an APA rulemaking procedure ','
According to critics, the audit policy delineates
the Agency's enforcement response to environ-
mental violations with such certainty that it
should be sublect to a rulemaking as required
by the APA91
This section examines the differences
between policies and rules under the APA, and
as interpreted by the courts It then analyzes the
audit policy to determine whether it should
have been issued as a rule The analysis con-
cludes by finding the audit policy a valid state-
ment of policy, not in need of an APA rulemak-
Ing
87 See Dana, supra note 5, at 979-91
88 See tU for a full discussion of the economics of
prevention, inaction, or auditing under an immunity
framework
89 See rd
90 See Riedel Interview, supra note 79 (discussing
the feedback collected by the agency during the c¢mment
period between publication of the interim and Final
Policy Statementsl, see alo Final Polah y Statement, :upra
note 2. at 66,710
91 See5 U SC § 553 1bl 11994)
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A. Rules vs. Policy Under the Administrative
Procedure Act
Rules are Agency-made laws.92 Agencies
cannot pass rules unless authorized by statute.
But, so long as a rule does not exceed the
Agency's statutory authority (including the
APA), it is enforceable as law. Further, unlike the
legislative branch of the government, agencies
are not constrained by the separation of powers
doctrine. Within the limits of their mandate, the
APA, and due process, agencies make, enforce,
and adjudicate laws.93 Because agencies wield
such power, the APA requires that Agency-made
rules undergo a review process, including pub-
lishing the proposed rule in the Federal
Register,94 inviting public comment,95 compos-
ing a mandatory Agency response to those com-
ments,96 and allowing the opportunity for judi-
cial review.97 Policies, on the other hand, do not
formally bind agencies or regulated entities and
therefore require no formal review process.
Consequently, in matters where the Agency
wishes to allow both itself and its constituents
latitude, policies can prove more efficient and
expedient than rules.
Policies suggest the position the Agency
will likely take in an adjudication. Rather than
promulgating specific rules of conduct, policies
explain the likely reaction of the Agency to cer-
tain behavior. They are meant to guide both the
Agency and its constituents in determining how
the Agency will likely respond to certain behav-
ior. Rules serve a similar function; they do not
lock the Agency into an enforcement strategy
since any such actions are taken at the discre-
tion of the Agency. However, a rule would estab-
lish a binding set of criteria that must be met
before initiating enforcement. The decision
92. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (acknowledging that agency-
made rules are laws enforceable in the same manner as
those made by Congress).
93 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton,
Administrative Law, § 4.1 (1993).
94. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994).
95 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994).
96 See id.
97 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994); see also Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 541-50
whether to enforce, if the criteria are met,
belongs to the Agency.98 But the criteria, once
promulgated in a rule, eliminate much of the
flexibility that would be available Linder a policy.
Because they do not legally bind the
Agency or its regulated entities, policies are
not subject to judicial review. The flexibility
offered by a policy may sometimes outweigh
the increased force of law that inheres in a rule.
The rulemaking process may seem overly bur-
densome, and the constraints of a formal rule
may inhibit the Agencys responsiveness. In
addition, the Agency may not feel entirely
secure with its policy, and may wish to avoid
the scrutiny that accompanies a formal rule-
making. 99
Since agencies control activities and dis-
pense items of great value (e.g., licenses, food
stamps, health care), a statement of the
Agencys position on a given issue can have a
profound impact upon regulated entities,
Those who cannot afford to displease the enti-
ty that controls their livelihood will likely
change their behavior to meet Agency guide-
lines. Consequently, in practice, the line
between a rule, which mandates cartain behav-
ior, and a policy, which "suggests" behavior
while relying on the threat of Agency action for
emphasis, can become quite blurred. 100
Indeed, a key reason that agencies often
prefer policies is that the confusion over how
to distinguish a policy from a rule has led to
considerable judicial deference for Agency
actions. Policies currently receive the deferen-
tial "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
review that courts once reserved for legislative
rules.i1i This allows agenciesto make binding
pronouncements without subjecting those pro-
(1978) (establishing procedural requirements for rule-
making; agencies may, at their discretlor,, Impose addi-
tional requirements, but the courts may not do so)
98. See Heckler v. Chaney. 470 U.S 21, 831 (1985).
99. See Aman & Mayton. supra note 03, at § 40
100. See id at § 4 2,2; see also Robert A Anthony,
"Interpretive" Rules, "Legislative'" Rules and 'Spurious" Rules,
Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L J. AM U. I, 9, especially n 29
(1994) (analyzing and classifying the binding effects of
various agency documents)
101. See APA, 5 U.S C. § 706(2) (I094) ('The review-
ing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency
D~d N. Cossuto Voltme 5, Number 3
Spnn~i 1999 F~WrL SdI~ki&t Poky
nouncements to the scrutiny of a rulemaking.i02
Free from the pressure that the public and
industry can bring to bear, an Agency can effec-
tively operate by fiat rather than with the over-
sight mandated by the APA.' 03
In a number of cases, the courts have found
that policy statements by agencies amounted
to rules in disguise.10 4 At other times they have
upheld the Agency's policy guidelines as appro-
priate. In Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 105 for example, the Eighth Circuit
held that the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion's (ICC) practice of determining the reason-
ableness of the contracts between railroads and
shippers on a case-by-case basis amounted to
a policy rather than a rule. The railroads had
claimed that the policy bound the Agency to a
specific code of behavior and should therefore
have been set down for a rulemaking. The court
disagreed, finding that the policy did not estab-
lish a binding legal norm for all contractual
arrangements. Instead, it left the Agency free to
"exercise considerable discretion" when evalu-
action, findings and conclusions found to be arbitrary.
capricious, an abuse of discretion "). Id, Courts have
also applied this standard to policy statements, see, e g,
Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F3d 875. 877 (D.C. Cir, 1993); Capital
Network Sys. v. FCC, 3 F3d 1526. 1530 (D.C. Cir 1993);
American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 755 F2d 1292,
1299 (7th Cir. 1985).
102. See Richard 1. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify
Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADmIN. L. REV. 59 (1995) (arguing that
courts accord greater deference to policy statements and
interpretative rules than to legislative rules and that pol-
icy statements often bind judges to the same extent as do
rules). Professor Pierce analyzes Stinson v, United States,
508 U.S. 36 (1993) and Williams v. United States, 503 U S
193 (1992). both of which involved interpretive rules
rather than policy statements. Though Professor Pierce's
analysis seems to conflate interpretive rules and policy
statements, he is correct in observing that the Court
seems to merge the two as well. He uses the aforemen-
tioned decisions to demonstrate how the Court has man-
dated significant judicial deference to both policies and
interpretive rules. In Stinson, for example, which reviewed
Sentencing Commission legislative documents rather
than policy statements, the Court declared that Itihe
principle that the Guidelines Manual is binding on feder-
al courts applies as well to policy statements." Stinson, 508
U.S. at 42.
103. See Robert A. Anthony & David A, Codevilla,
Pro-Ossification: A Harder Look at Agency Poticy Statements,. 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667, 669 (1996).
104. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v, United
ating individual cases. °6 Rather than setting
down the substance of Agency determinations,
the policy instead referred to the form by which
those determinations would be made. The
court found that form without substance did
not amount to a rule, and therefore did not war-
rant the railroad's participation in its formula-
tion i07
The D C Circuit used similar reasoning in
National Latino Media Coalition v Federal Communi-
cations Commission-0 The FCC released a written
announcement stating that it intended to con-
duct a lottery to determine which of the many
equally qualified applicants would receive an
FCC license i0 The court concluded that the
announcement was a policy rather than a rule,
stating "These statements merely present an
interpretation of the Agency s governing
statute They do not bind the Commission ever
to conduct a tie-breaker lottery " 1'1
States, 316 U S 407 11942 In this famous "CBS case the
Supreme Court held that the FCC s announced disfavor of
certain contractual relationships bet',een lo:al and net-
work radio stations amounted to a polii rather than a
rule. United States Tel Ass n v Federal Communications
Comm'n. 28 F3d 1232 ID C Cir 1994j Ipenalty schedule
promulgated by FCC amounted to a -rule in masquerade
and was therefore subject to a formal rulemalingi
Chamber ot Commerce v OSHA 636 F2d 464 IDC C r
19801 (OSHAs announcement that employers fadlure to
pay employees for azccmpanyfng ageny inspector on
walkaround mspectfons would be prose:,uted as dis-
crimination amounted to a rule and must therefore
undergo a formal rulemakingi
105 See Iowa Power & Light co - Burlington
Northern. Inc 647 F2d 796 18th Cir Q31 , cert denied, 455
US 907 (19821
106 Seerd at 811
107 See td For a good discssion of this case as
well as the plicirrule dichotomy, see, W llam T Mayton
The Concept of a Rule and the 'Substantia Impact Test in
Rulemaking 33 E" :, LI 889. 9c19 119841
108 National Latino Media Coalition v Federal
Communications Comm n. 816 F2d 785 (DC Cir 1987),
109 Seeid at 787
110 Id at 789 For further discussion of this and
related cases see Paul N Rechenberg Note Losing The
Bittle On Obzcenity, But Can We Win The Warl The Nationat
Endox&ment For The ArV Fight Against Funding Obxcene Artatic
Works. 57 Mc,'r RE; 299 31111992j
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B. Tests for Determining Whether a Policy is
Actually a Rule
Two tests have emerged for determining
whether an Agency dictate amounts to a policy
or a rule: the "Force of Law" test and the
"Substantial Impact" test.Iii The Force of Law
test looks at the legal impact of the Agency
action. Under this test, the policy statement
has the force of law if both the Agency and its
regulated entities behave as if the Agency
requires adherence to its stated position. If so,
the policy is actually a disguised ruleand sub-
lect to a rulemaking. 1 2 The Substantial Impact
test is less formalist. It looks to whether the
Agency action causes "palpable effects" to reg-
ulated entities and the general public. If so,
then the action must undergo the scrutiny and
public comment that accompanies a rulemak-
ing procedure.i 3 Under either test, the audit
policy does not qualify as a rule.
I Force of Law Test
The Force of Law test has two prerequi-
sites. First, Congress must formally grant a
rulemaking power to an Agency.' 4 Rulemaking
power accompanies any delegation of substan-
tive power by Congress to an Agency, although
the parameters of the rulemaking power may
vary from statute to statute. 15 For example,
Congress may delegate authority to EPA to
enforce the Clean Air Act but reserve for itself
the right to determine emissions standards for
carbon monoxide for new cars. Whereas, in the
Clean Water Act, Congress may give EPA full
authority to set effluent quality standards in
every area.
Second, the proposed rule must derive its
authority from the statute that the Agency is
implementing. To show an illegal act by a reg-
ulated entity, the Agency need only show a vio-
lation of the rule, rather than a violation of the
statute. In other words, statutes lay out broad
I 11. See Aman & Mayton, supra note 93, at § 4.3.
112. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
I13. See National Helium Corp. v. Federal Energy
Admin., 569 F2d 1137 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977).
114. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v.
parameters and goals, instructing agencies to
adopt rules which then fill in the gaps, specify-
ing which behavior does and does not conform
with the law. Reasoning syllogistically, if a rule
specifies how to obey a law, and an entity vio-
lates the rule, then the entity mu3t have violat-
ed the law as well.
The leading case for the Force of Law
approach is Pacific Gas & Electric Co v. Federal
Power Comrnmission.ii6 In upholding the Power
Commission's use of a policy statement rather
than a rule to announce its methodology for
curtailing natural gas usage during times of
shortage, the D.C. Circuit found that the
Commission had merely announced the policy
it would use in subsequent adjudications,
rather than creating a blanket rule The opinion
laid out the difference between a policy and a
rule as follows:
In administrative proceedings
involving a substantive rule, the issues
are whether the adjudicated facts con-
form to the rule and whether the rule
should be waived or applied in that
particular instance.
A general statement of policy on the
other hand, does not establish a "bind-
ing norm." ITIhe Agency cannot
apply or rely on a general statement of
policy as law. [Wlhen the Agency
applies the policy in a particular situa-
tion, it must be prepared to support
the policy lust as if the policy state-
ment had never been issued,I1
Though the Power Commission's policy
effectively forced many natural gas users to
begin an immediate search for alternative
energy sources, the court nonetheless found
that, since the decision had been issued as a
United States Postal Serv 707 F2d 543, 558 (DC Cir
1983), cert. denied, 465 U S. 1100 (1984)
115. See Morton v, Ruiz, 415US 199 231 (1974)
116. See Pacific Gas & Elec Co v Federal Power
Comm'n, 506 F2d 33 (DC. Cir 1974).
117. Id at 38-39.
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policy statement, it lacked the "force of law"ii 8
and therefore could not possibly have been
enforced as such. The tautology embedded in
this reasoning (a policy cannot have the force of
a rule because policies lack the force of rules)
has not been lost on the courts, including the
D.C. Circuit in later decisions. 19 While no bind-
ing precedent exists dictating the proper test for
determining whether a policy is in fact a rule in
disguise, recent years have witnessed a drift
away from the Force of Law test and toward the
Substantial Effects test.12
0
2. Applying the Force of Law Test to the
Audit Policy
Though courts have applied the Force of
Law test less frequently in recent years, the test
has not been categorically discarded. Further-
more, there remains no consensus as to the
best method for distinguishing rules from poli-
cies. It will therefore prove instructive for both
legal and analytical reasons to apply the test to
the federal audit policy.
A rule dictates behavior, either of the regu-
lated entity or the regulating Agency. By con-
trast, a policy offers guidance while binding nei-
ther side. The key determinative factors in the
Force of Law test involve whether: (1) the policy
statement establishes a "binding norm;"12i and
(2) whether the Agency relies on the policy as a
general statement of law.' 22 Then, to qualify as
a policy rather than a rule, the Agency must (3)
"be prepared to support the policy just as if the
policy statement had never been issued." 123
118. Seeid.at41.
119. See, e.g., community Nutrition Inst v Young,
818 E2d 943, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (l[Alction levels" estab-
lished by the FDA for contamrfnants in food amounted to
a rule rather than policy because the agency guidelines
"set a precise level of contamination that the FDA
deems permissible.").
120. See Aman & Mayton, supra note 93. at § 4 3
(noting that since the early seventies, courts have begun
to turn away from the "facile semantic distinctions" of the
force of law approach).
121. See Pacific Gas & Elec Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33. 49 (D.C. Cir. 1974). see aLo United
States Telephone v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 28
F.3d 1232, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
122. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33. 49 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
It seems doubtful that the audit policy cre-
ates a binding norm. The text of the Final Policy
Statement expressly declines to bind affected
parties) 24 though it does spell out with some
specificity the particular procedures for volun-
tary disclosure of environmental violations in
order to lessen the Agency's enforcement
response" 21 Nonetheless, neither the Final
Policy Statement nor the Interim Policy
demands specific behavior from regulated enti-
ties. The decision to self-audit is entirely volun-
tary. This poses a stark contrast to the examples
offered by Professor Anthony wherein the
Agency attempted to use policy statements to
dictate the behavior of regulated entities t26
The audit policy also leaves room for
Agency discretion As noted earlier, EPA can
decline to seek restitution depending on the
amount of economic benefit derived from a par-
ticular violation i27 It thus remains an open
question as to whether the policy creates a
"binding norm" even with respect to Agency
behavior
Some critics and state legislatures contend
that the audit policy binds states, preventing
them from using their own methods for envi-
ronmental enforcement They point to the
Agency's stated opposition to state laws granti-
ng privilege and immunity to violators i2' They
reason that if the Agency can threaten to disap-
prove a State Implementation Plan (SIP) for
enforcing federal environmental law by alleging
incompatibility with the audit policy, then the
audit policy must have the force of law This
123 I1
124 Final Policy Statement supra note 2 at 66,712
(-The policy is not a final agency a-tion and is intended
as guidance It does not create any rights, duties, obliga-
tions, or defenses implied or otherxise, in any third par-
ties ')
125 See Final Palicy Statement 5upra note 2 at
66,711 and a,:ompanying text
126 See Community Nutrtion Inst v Young 818
F2d 943 (D C Cir 19871
127 Final Policy Statement, :upra note 2 at 66,707-
128 Final Policy Statement supra note 2 at 66,712
I-EPA remains firmly opposed to statutoriy environmental
audit privileges that shield evidence of environmental
violations as well as to blanket immunities for viola-
tions I
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argument has merit, but close examination
reveals that the Final Policy Statement leaves
considerable room for state statutory discre-
tion.
EPA has not objected to the majority of
state statutes that allow some form of privi-
lege and/or immunity, and in other cases has
merely asked for clarification from the states'
attorneys general. 129 Additionally, if the test for
determining whether a policy is actually a cam-
ouflaged rule lies in whether the Agency can
"support the policy just as if the policy state-
ment had never been issued,"130 then one
could convincingly argue that it is not the
audit policy but the federal statutes them-
selves that void state laws that impede
enforcement. EPA need not rely on the audit
policy to nullify a SIP Indeed, since the audit
policy is not a rule, it lacks the statutory
authority to do so. To void a SIP, the Agency
must show that a particular state law creating
an evidentiary privilege and/or immunity for
violators interferes with the efficient enforce-
ment of federal law.
The audit policy satisfies the second prong
of the analysis in that EPA relies on it as a
statement of law. The policy outlines the
Agency's response to violations discovered
through self-audits13i and the Agency acknowl-
edges that the policy sets "minimum statutory
guidelines."132 As one Agency official noted,
"Practically speaking, we're applying it like a
rule."133
Regarding the third question, whether EPA
can, when enforcing the policy, support it just
as if the policy statement had never been
issued, the answer appears to be yes. Since the
policy binds no one but EPA, the Agency need
only justify its own actions. The actions at
129. See State Immunity, Pnvilege Laws Examined for
Conflicts Affecting Delegated Programs, DAILY ENVIRONMENT
REPORT, Sep. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNAED file (finding that "most states with audit laws are
facing no threat to their federally delegated environmen-
tal programs" and that often, letters of clarification from
state attorneys general have laid EPs concerns to rest).
130. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
131. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2.
issue involve a mitigated Enforcement
response to a voluntary disclosure of a viola-
tion. Under any circumstances, the Agency
would wish to encourage voluntary disclosure
and remediation. It would not require a pub-
lished policy to justify a mitigated response
intended to achieve that aim.13 4 By this rea-
soning, the Agency guidance more resembles a
policy than a rule.
In the final analysis, the audit policy with-
stands the Force of Law test. First, the policy
may or may not create a binding norm. Even if
it did, it would bind the Agency alone, and only
in the sense that it stipulates certain Agency
responses to voluntary behavior oi the part of
regulated entities. Second, EPA apparently
relies on the audit policy as a statement of law,
thereby suggesting a rule rather than a policy
Third, the Agency can support its policy as if
the policy statement had never been issued.
The audit policy likely clears the first hur-
dle, stumbles on the second, and clears the
third. Since all three components are neces-
sary for a policy to have the force of law, the
audit policy lacks the force of law
Consequently, under the Force of Law stan-
dard, a rulemaking is not necessary.
3. Substantial Effects Test
The Substantial Effects test looks less at
the letter of the Agency dictate than at its
impact. In deciding whether a policy has a sub-
stantial effect and should therefore be a rule,
courts use a two-pronged analysi3, First they
look to whether the purported policy imposes
any rights or obligations upon the public.
Second, they attempt to determine whether
the policy limits an Agency's discretion in later
determinations. 135
132. See Herman, supra note 5
133. See Riedel, supra note 80.
134. See also Chevron, U.S A Inc v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U S. 837 844 (1984)
(agency interpretations of statutes deserve great judicial
deference unless they are arbitrary or capricious)
135 See. e.g Alaska v. Department of Transp 868
F2d 441, 446-47 (D.C. Cir. 1989), American Hosp. Ass'n v.
Bowen, 834 F2d 1037 1046 (D.C, Cir 1987); Community
Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F2d 943, 946 (0 C Cr 1987);
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The lodestar case for the Substantial
Effects test is Community Nutrition Institute v.
Young.' 36 In Young, the D.C. Circuit held that the
"action levels" for allowable levels of aflatoxin
in foods set forth in a policy statement by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) constitut-
ed a rule rather than a policy statement.
Consequently, the court found that the setting
of action levels required a rulemaking.
Under the FDA policy, producers who sold
food containing aflatoxin levels higher than
specified were subject to enforcement action.
Furthermore, the policy's language was stated
in mandatory terms: contaminants in excess of
the action levels "will be deemed to be adulterat-
ed." 37 In the court's view, the threat of enforce-
ment created a new obligation for the public
while the mandatory nature of the policy lan-
guage limited the FDA's discretion as to when
to initiate enforcement proceedings. Since the
FDA's action had a substantially similar effect
to a rule, it needed to undergo the rulemaking
process. 13 8
4. Applying the Substantial Effects Test to
the Audit Policy
Applying the two-pronged Substantial
Effects test to the audit policy yields a similarly
mixed result to that in the Force of Law analy-
sis. The first prong involves inquiring whether
the Agency statement imposes any rights or
obligations upon the public. The second prong
requires assessing whether the policy improp-
erly limits Agency discretion in later determina-
tions. 139
As noted above, the audit policy does not
directly impose obligations on the public 40 It
simply outlines the Agency's likely response to
voluntary actions (self-audit and disclosure) by
regulated entities. States are arguably bur-
dened because the policy obstructs their ability
American Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 E2d 525. 529
(D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Royal C. Gardner. Public Participation
and Wetlands Regulation, 10 UCLA J. ENMrL L. & Po.y 1, 10
(1991) (companng the substantial effects and force of law
tests).
136. See Community Nutrition Inst, v. Young, 818
F2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
137. Id. at 947 (emphasis added).
to legislate privilege and immunity laws. Yet,
this is hardly a burden. SIPs enforce federal law
and are approved or disapproved at the discre-
tion of the federal government, it stands to rea-
son that the federal Agency overseeing the SIP
should have the authority to determine if the
SIP is being effectively administered If a states
laws interfere with its obligations to carry out
federal law. then the burden on the state does
not derive from the audit policy but from feder-
alism itself In other words, the only constraint
arising from the audit policy is one that already
existed; that states not pass laws that impede
the enforceability of federal statutes
The second question, whether the policy
improperly limits Agency discretion, is slightly
more problematic The policy does limit Agency
discretion by requiring it to forego seeking grav-
ity-based penalties from qualifying entities The
policy also prevents the Agency from recom-
mending criminal prosecution based on audit
results 141 It remains an open question, howev-
er, whether these limitations are improper The
Agency has a clear policy goal of encouraging
self-audits and disclosure The audit policy
accomplishes this goal without forfeiting EPA's
discretion with regard to serious violators or
those entities that choose not to self-audit. The
only strictures placed on the Agency s behavior
concern specific mitigation measures for those
entities that choose to audit
Furthermore, even if the limitations seem
severe. EPA could argue that they still are
appropriate As one Agency official noted, the
publication of the interim and final policy state-
ments met all the APA procedural safeguards
for a rulemaking,14 2 including publication in the
Federal Register and solicitation of public com-
ment-i43 Neither of these steps is required for
policies If EPA decides to issue the audit poli-
cy as a rule (which it reserves the right to do at
138 See id at 945-48
139 Seetid at 946
140 See Final Policy Statement, ;upra note 124. at
66,712 and accompanying text
141 See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at
66,706
142 Riedel, supra note 79
143 See5USC §553(1994J-
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a later date),i0 it would involve little more than
proposing the policy in the Federal Register.)
45
In light of these extraordinary lengths the
Agency went to in formulating the policy, it
would be difficult to argue that a few limits on
Agency discretion regarding response to a vol-
untary disclosure from a regulated entity are
inappropriate.
The two components of the Substantial
Effects test are whether a policy burdens the
public and/or inappropriately limits Agency dis-
cretion. The foregoing discussion has shown
that that the audit policy does neither and that
it consequently passes the Substantial Effects
test. Therefore, under either standard, Force of
Law or Substantial Effects, the audit policy does
not require a rulemaking.
5. EPA Attempts to Legislate Through
Policy Memoranda Have Decreased
EPA has, over the years, acquired the repu-
tation of a "champion in the game of 'rule by
memorandum."'1 46 Recently, though, the Agency
has become more sensitive to the differences
between policies and rules. That sensitivity
arose of necessity, due to a growing negative
public response to Agency attempts at govern-
ing by policy statement. Professor Robert
Anthony points to two instructive examples of
EPA initially attempting to legislate through
policy memoranda, then later agreeing either to
clarify its policy or to issue a rule.
147
In the first case, EPA stated in the preamble
to its Notice of Clarification approving
Kentucky's State Implementation Plan (SIP)
under the Clean Air Act 148 that EPA approval of
144. See Final Policy Statement, supra note 2, at
66,710 ("[EPA] will consider this issue and will provide
notice if it determines a rulemaking is appropriate.").
145. See Riedel Interview, supra note 80.
146. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy
Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1346
(1992).
147 See id. at 1346-49.
148. Notification of Clarification, 54 Fed. Reg,
36,307 (1989).
149 See id. at 36,307-08.
150. Westvacov. EPA, No. 89-3975 (6th Cir. filed Oct.
revisions to a SIP had the effect of "requiring the
State to follow EPA's current and future inter-
pretations of the Act's provisions as well as
EPA's operating policies and guidance/" 49 In the
wake of protests and the commencement of lit-
igation, 150 EPA issued a second Notice of
Clarification ' declaring that In:erpretations
and guidances do not have the force of law and
that failure to obey them did not, in and of itself,
violate the Clean Air Act. 15 2
The second example involved EPA agreeing
to use a rulemaking to set emission standards
for new facilities or modification of existing
facilities in regions currently in compliance with
national air quality standards. For years, EPA
had utilized a "bottom-up" approach to its
requirement that emissions limitations be
based on "best available control technology"
(BACT). 153 BACT meant that the permitting
authority weighed several factors lo determine
what technology was achievable and attainable
under the circumstances. Permittees need not
install the most effective methods of emission
control if they could demonstrate i hat its costs
outweighed its benefits. In 1987-88, some
offices within EPA began implementing a "top-
down" approach, requiring applicants to use the
most effective technology unless they could
show it to be infeasible. In 1988, EPA issued a
memorandum stating that those not using "top-
down" approach to BACT would be deemed per-
mit deficient and potentially sublect to enforce-
ment action. 154
Litigation ensued challenging E PAs author-
ity to implement the top-down aporoach with-
out going through a legislative rulemaking. 15 In
31, 1989).
151. 55 Fed Reg. 23,547-48 (1990)
152. 42 U.S.C. § 7402 (1998)
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (1998)
154, See Anthony, supra note 146, at 1349 n 221, cit-
ing Memorandum from Michael S Alujhin, Associate
Enforcement Counsel for Air, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Monitoring, and John S S;eitz, Director,
Stationary Source Compliance Division, Office of Air
Ouality Planning and Standards, to various recipients (July
15, 1988).
155. The principal case in this dispute was
American Paper Inst. v. Reilly No. 89-20'0 (DD C filed
July 18, 1989). See Anthony, supra note 146, at 1389
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1991. EPA and the plaintiffs settled the suits.
EPA agreed to submit the BACT directive to a
formal rulemaking and acknowledged that the
"EPA BACT policy statement is not intended
to create binding legal rights or obligations and
does not have the force and effect of law."'
56
In both of the preceding examples, EPA
attempted to create a binding Agency directive
without undergoing the proper rulemaking pro-
cedure. 5 7 Each time, widespread protest and
the commencement of litigation forced the
Agency to reconsider. Taken together these
examples indicate that EPA has, of necessity,
acquired an increased sensitivity to the need for
a rulemaking when the Agency expects expect-
ing universal compliance with one of its direc-
tives. 58 It bears noting, however, that this new-
found sensitivity came grudgingly, could be
episodic, and might well vanish with the next
presidential election.
V. Should the Audit Policy be a Rule
Instead?
Though the audit policy is not a rule in dis-
guise, the question remains whether it might
prove more effective and less controversial if it
were made into a rule. An audit rule would con-
clusively set forth EPA's position on what con-
stitutes legal encouragement for entities that
wish to audit. It would also reduce ambiguity
and misunderstandings concerning possible
Agency reactions to audit results. States and
regulated entities would enjoy the security of
knowing with certainty what behavior is accept-
able.
These proposed benefits to an audit rule.
however, could just as easily be viewed as detri-
ments. Specifying the parameters on state audit
laws removes a great deal of the states' discre-
tion in enforcing federal environmental laws.
Even if the rule were flexible, it would still create
constraints, otherwise it would offer no greater
156. Anthony. supra note 146, at 1389. quoting set-
tlement agreement for cases cited above, supra note 128
(July 9 and 10, 1991).
157 The procedure for rulemaking in most cases is
set forth in the APA, 5 U.SC. § 553 (1994). The Clean Air
Act, however, has its own rulemaking procedure, which is
untethered to the APA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1994)
clarity than a policy while offering a greater
threat of enforcement Under the current policy,
EPA can negotiate with states regarding the
scope and impact of state statutes If the policy
were a rule, it would mandate a particular
Agency response (i e, suspending a state's abil-
ity to implement its SIP) if a given state law did
not conform to the rule's specifications-
Currently, both states and EPA have the flexibil-
ity to craft agreements that may not necessarily
conform to a rigid interpretation of the policy
Often the negotiations leading to such agree-
ments dispel any cloud of Agency disapproval If
the policy were a rule, that flexibility would like-
ly disappear Citizens' groups would file suit to
force the rule's enforcement and the Agency
would have no choice but to adhere strictly to
the letter of the law
Perhaps the most important constituency in
the rule/policy debate is the regulated commu-
nity. Yet, even here, the choice between a rule
and a policy offers no clearly superior option- If
the audit policy were a rule, it would present
clearly delineated dictates that an entity could
follow, or disregard at its peril. The entity could
also challenge the rule in court, an option that
presents considerably fewer complications than
challenging a policy 11"
A rule designating criteria for enforcement
actions would create the potential for volumi-
nous litigation The affected entity could liti-
gate whether it has met every criterion for trig-
gering an enforcement action For example, if
the Agency decided to seek gravity-based
penalties from an entity under the current pol-
icy regime, the entity could not challenge its
decision based on a supposed lack of adher-
ence to the audit policy If the policy were a
rule, however, the entity could litigate its non-
compliance with each of the nine delineated
factors before paying the penalty This oppor-
tunity to litigate the mechanics of the rule's
enforcement would arguably benefit the regu-
158 Seenthony ,upra note 146, at 1349
159 SeeAntbh m, :upra nzte i0and azzompan' ng
teat Idiscusssng nebulous standards presented by the
Force ot Lw anJ Substantil [mp3t test With rules, the
guidelines tcr iudicial re tew are buit into the APA. 5
USC §70411q941
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lated community. The torrent of litigation and
resulting ill will with the Agency could, howev-
er, also work to industry's detriment.
Furthermore, for entities, just as for states,
the clarity offered by a rule comes with a price.
Just as clothing labeled "one size fits all" fits no
one particularly well, so too does a rule
designed for universal applicability lose its
ability to customize itself to suit a particular
entity. Lastly, regulated entities, like state and
federal agencies, might find themselves the
target of citizen enforcement suits designed to
force the rule's enforcement. That could result
in unnecessary enforcement actions and/or
needless expenditures of time and resources in
litigation.
VI. Conclusion
Sound policy reasons exist for an audit
policy that encourages self-audits and volun-
tary disclosure. EPA's audit policy adequately
meets those needs. State laws seeking to
strengthen the allure of self audits by privileg-
ing audit results and/or immunizing the viola-
tor seem gratuitous and potentially detrimen-
tal. There exists no evidence to suggest that
the federal policy's lack of privilege or immuni-
ty has deterred industry from auditing, or vio-
lators from coming forward. Furthermore,
granting privilege or immunity to violators
allows an unfair advantage over industries that
comply with environmental laws.
Second, though in some respects the audit
policy skirts dangerously close to a disguised
rule, it does not require a rulemaking under
either the Force of Law or the Substantial
Effects tests. The ludicial standard for deter-
mining a rule from a policy remains ambigu-
ously drawn. Nonetheless, given that the audit
policy merely sets forth guidelines for Agency
response to voluntary behavior from the regu-
lated sector, and since the Final Policy
Statement was issued after extensive public
comment and debate, this does riot appear to
be an example of the Agency governing by pol-
icy rather than by APA approved rules.
Lastly, while rules offer clarity, they also
diminish flexibility on all sides while increas-
ing the likelihood of litigation. The advantages
offered to states and the regulated community
do not appear to outweigh the potential detri-
ments. Probably the most important indicator
of the appropriateness of a policy rather than a
rule is that no state or regulated entity has
challenged the policy's validity or claimed that
it is a rule in disguise. Instead, statistics show
an increasing amount of self-audits and con-
formity with the audit policy even though the
majority of states have declined to create a
statutory privilege or immunity for auditors,
Furthermore, most of the states :hat do have
privilege or immunity statutes have negotiated
the statutes' parameters with EPA and do not
fear Agency reprisal.
The policy works; a rule may not work as
well. Why disturb a good thing?
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